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5 OCT 1962

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MEMORANDUM FOR:

SUBJECT : Couriers

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Without getting deeply involved in the specific recommendations of the report, it seems to me the place for us to begin now is with the correspondence procedures of the Agency. Nearly all of the problems we have with couriers and registries have grown out of varying independent and dispersed attempts at developing procedures and techniques to control and protect classified documents. We have never had any real effort to establish uniformity in Agency correspondence procedures because people recoil at the notion, calling to mind immediately all of the exceptions that must be tolerated -- such as cryptographic, SI, TS, cables, dispatches, etc., etc.

It seems to me conceptually at least, that it should be possible to develop a correspondence control procedure which can apply throughout the Agency, and which would provide for the fact that unclassified mail is the only real exception in this organization and the others are only variations of the same kind of thing.

Going one step further, control of correspondence is really nothing more than good management. It is just as important that management controls are established sufficient to ensure that appropriate action is taken, recorded, and the record preserved with unclassified as it is with classified matters. Varying degrees of security and sensitivity may impose additional restrictions on the system, but fundamentally it is nothing more than good management to be able to know at any time what has happened to your mail.

If this premise is accepted, the development of a reasonable system for correspondence control will clearly show how extensive the need for registries really is, and should indicate where they need to be located, how they should function, etc. Having this information, it should then be possible to determine what the delivery requirements are, and what the courier system should be.

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If the correspondence control system is reasonable and satisfies the various requirements of components as well as their special security problems, it should be much easier to determine and sell what changes in registries are really indicated as well as point up the degree of centralization needed to provide an effective courier system.

If this seems to be a reasonable approach, perhaps you should call a meeting of [] and yourself for the purpose of getting agreement upon this approach, or some facsimile thereof. Then you might designate me to study the DD/S with some help from a Security guy, maybe; [] might assign one of his Indians together with somebody from [] could give us a couple of somebody's, possibly one from OCI; and we might even get [] to hang around for this working exercise. If [] comes in, maybe you should chair the working group, if he doesn't, perhaps I could chair it.

However the group may be composed, I would suggest that it begin by defining and describing the controls that are really needed to properly manage correspondence in the Agency. With this definition we could then proceed to look at the existing systems to find out where they deviate and come up with proposed changes.

Out of this exercise we should be able to get a correspondence Regulation and Handbook to satisfy most requirements.

The degree and method of controlling correspondence should then, optimistically, show us fairly clearly and obviously who needs what registries where, and how many people are going to have to run between them.

[]
Special Assistant to the
Deputy Director (Support)

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